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WHOSE CHILD IS IT ANYWAY? AWARDING
JOINT CUSTODY OVER THE OBJECTION OF
ONE PARENT
"The only absolute in the law governing custody of children is
that there are no absolutes."'
I. Introduction
Today approximately one of every two marriages ends in di-
vorce, 2 or results in "some form of marital breakdown." 3 The divorce
rate has unquestionably been growing at a rapid pace in recent years.
In 1960, there were 2.2 divorces for every 1,000 Americans; by 1982
that figure had more than doubled to 5.0. 4 More than one million
divorces now occur in this country every year,5 of which a significant
number involve children. 6
More often than not, a court awards custody of the children
to one parent, and grants visitation rights to the other. 7 Since "[tihe
1. Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767, 447
N.Y.S.2d 893, 895 (1982).
2. See Weber, Alone Together: The Unromantic Generation, N.Y. Times, Apr.
5, 1987, § 6 (Magazine), at 25; Otten, Deceptive Picture: If You See Families
Making a Comeback, It's Probably a Mirage, Wall St. J., Sep. 25, 1986, at 1,
col. 1. In the late 1970's, experts estimated that one of every three marriages ended
in divorce. See M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE PARENT 48 (1978)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter DISPOSABLE PARENT].
3. H. Keshet, Part-time Fathers: A Study of Separated and Divorced Men
Who are Highly Involved with Child Rearing 4 (1977) (available at Fordham Urban
Law Journal office) [hereinafter Part-time Fathers].
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1986, 79. The rate for New York State in 1982 was 3.6 divorces per 1,000 residents.
Id. at 81.
5. See id. at 79. In 1982, the most recent year for which statistics are available,
1,170,000 marriages ended in divorce. Id.
6. Id. Of the 1,170,000 divorces in 1982, see supra note 5, 1,108,000 involved
children. See id.
7. See Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview, 16 FAM.
L.Q. 289, 290 (1983); see also R. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY
LITIGATION 20 (1982); Folberg & Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following
Divorce, 12 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 523, 525-26 (1979) [hereinafter Joint Custody of
Children].
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essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right
to make decisions regarding his [or her] care and control, education,
health, and religion," ' the custody determination is absolutely crucial
to the subsequent lives of parents and children.
In recent years, the practice of routinely awarding custody to one
parent with visitation rights to the other "has come under attack." 9
One proposed alternative is an arrangement known as "joint cus-
tody.
Although courts have not yet precisely defined joint custody, the
term embodies two separate concepts-physical custody and legal
custody.'0 Joint legal custody generally means that all decisions
regarding the child's health, education and welfare are made by the
parents jointly," while joint physical custody usually means that
physical care of the child is shared by both parents equitably, though
not necessarily equally.' 2 Custody arrangements vary, and courts may
award joint legal custody without joint physical custody. 3 Alter-
natively, joint physical custody may be ordered without joint legal
custody. 14 For purposes of this Note, discussion and analysis is
limited to joint legal custody.
Although joint custody has been criticized on several grounds, 5
the concept is now firmly established in most states. 6 At present,
8. Lerner v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. 2d 676, 681, 242 P.2d 321, 323 (1952).
9. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345, 355 (1979) [hereinafter Joint
Custody].
10. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486-87, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (1981); 1 J.
ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE § 6.02, at 356 (1986) [hereinafter
CHILD CUSTODY]. The author stated that "[a]lthough the statutes of most states
refer to the custodial arrangement as 'joint custody,' some states refer to the
custodial arrangement as 'shared custody.' " Id. at 356 n.6 (citations omitted).
The Beck court cautioned that "[j]oint custody must be distinguished from 'al-
ternating' custody (an arrangement in which parents alternate both physical and
legal custody) and 'split' custody (in the case of two or more children, each parent
is awarded sole custody of one or more of the children)." 86 N.J. at 486 n.2,
432 A.2d at 66 n.2. (citations omitted).
11. See Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1020, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449, 450 (1978); Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91 Misc. 2d 792, 795, 399
N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1977). Decisions are made jointly because
parents share the legal "authority for and the responsibilities in raising their
children." Steinman, Joint Custody: What We Know, What We Have Yet to Learn,
and the Judicial and Legislative Implications, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 739, 740
(1983).
12. See, e.g., CAL. Cry. CODE § 4600.5(d)(3) (West Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (Burns Supp. 1986).
13. CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 357.
14. Id.
15. See infra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 17.
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thirty-one states have joint custody statutes. 7 New York statutory
law does not expressly provide for an award of joint custody; 8 the
courts have, however, inferred the power to make such an award
from several sections of the Domestic Relations Law,' 9 provided that
such an award is in the best interests of the child .20
17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.060(c), 25.20.090, 25.20.100 (1983); CAL.
Crv. CODE §§ 4600(b)(1), 4600.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-123.5 (Supp. 1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (West 1986); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1985
& Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (1985); IDAi-O CODE § 32-717B (1983);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 602.1, 610(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1(4), 598.41
(West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1986); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 403.270(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); LA. Crv. CODE ANN. art.
146(A)(1) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(2)(C) (Supp.
1986); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1987); MIcH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.003131(b), (d),
518.1712] (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(1)(a)-(c) (Supp. 1987);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-4-
222 to -224 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480(1), 125.480(3)(a), 125.490
(Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(11), (III) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-4-9.1 (Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1984); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3109.04(A), (D) (Anderson 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1275.4B
(West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(a) (1985); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 5304 (Purdon Supp. 1987); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 14.03(a), 14.06(a)
(Vernon 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(b) (West 1981).
18. Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1978).
19. See N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §§ 70, 81 (McKinney 1977); id. § 240 (McKinney
1986). Section 240 provides:
In any action or proceeding brought . . . to obtain . . . the custody of
... any child ... the court must give such direction, . . . for the custody,
care, education and maintenance of any child ... as, in the court's
discretion, justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the
case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the child.
In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the
child in either parent.
Id. Section 70 provides that "the court shall determine solely what is for the best
interest of the child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and
make award accordingly." Id. § 70 (McKinney 1977).
Given this broad statutory mandate, the courts have the authority to fashion
custody orders that will best serve the particular circumstances of each case. Because,
under section 240 of the Domestic Relations Law, the court may award custody
to either parent, by implication the court may award custody to both parents. See
id. § 240 (McKinney 1986). In addition, because section 81 of the Domestic Relations
Law states that each parent is a joint guardian of his or her child, id. § 81
(McKinney 1977), and no statute expressly forbids joint custody, the courts have
held that they may award joint custody. See, e.g., Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91
Misc. 2d 792, 795, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 95 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
20. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Wasserburger v. Wasserburger, 42 A.D.2d 93,
94, 345 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47-48 (1st Dep't 1973), aff'd, 34 N.Y.2d 660, 311 N.E.2d
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Although the New York courts have acknowledged their implied
authority to award joint custody, they remain reluctant to do so. 2 1
Not surprisingly, the courts are even more reluctant to order joint
custody when one parent objects to such an arrangement. 22 This is
attributable, at least in part, to the "essentially negative and
pessimistic '2 3 tenor of the New York Court of Appeals' decision in
Braiman v. Braiman,24 the court's major pronouncement on the
subject of joint custody. Under Braiman, joint custody is viewed
"primarily as a voluntary alternative ' 25 for amicable parents, and
hence, is feasible only when the parents are in agreement. 26
This Note submits that such an approach is unduly restrictive and
thus inhibits full consideration of joint custody as an alternative to
the traditional award of sole custody. Part II of the Note discusses
the historical background of child custody and explains the emergence
651, 355 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1974); Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, 132, 355 N.Y.S.2d
68, 70 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1974); Odette R. v. Douglas R., 91 Misc. 2d 792,
795, 399 N.Y.S.2d 93, 96 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1977).
21. See Perotti v. Perotti, 78 Misc. 2d 131, 132, 355 N.Y.S.2d 68, 70 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County 1974); Eisenberg, New York, New Jersey Rulings Compared
in Joint Custody Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 19, 1982, at 3, col. 2 [hereinafter
Rulings Compared]; see also Meyer & Schlissel, Difficult Area for Judges-Child
Custody in Divorces, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Difficult
Area]. For a discussion of attempts to overcome this judicial reluctance by leg-
islation, see infra note 136.
22. See infra note 98. A parent may object to joint custody because he or
she genuinely believes that sole custody is best for the child. As discussed below,
depending on the circumstances, joint custody may still be feasible and indeed, in
the best interests of the child. This Note does not address, however, the situation
in which one party resists joint custody because the parents simply cannot agree
on how to raise their child.
23. Eisenberg, Joint Custody Proceedings, Judicial Rulings Compared, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 18, 1982, at 1, col. 3 [hereinafter Proceedings]. The opinion, authored by
Chief Judge Breitel, stated:
There are no painless solutions. In the rare case, joint custody may
approximate the former family relationships more closely than other
custodial arrangements. It may not, however, be indiscriminately sub-
stituted for an award of sole custody to one parent. Divorce dissolves
the family as well as the marriage, a reality that may not be ignored.
Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 591, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1022, 407 N.Y.S.2d
449, 452 (1978). Contra Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 488 n.3, 432 A.2d 63, 66 n.3
(1981) ("[w]e reject the notion that divorce dissolves the family as well as the
marriage") (citation omitted).
24. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978).
25. Id. at 589, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (citation omitted).
26. See Schulman & Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: An Analysis
of Legislation and Its Implications for Women and Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE
U.L. REv. 539, 548 (1982) [hereinafter Second Thoughts].
[Vol. XV
JOINT CUSTODY
of joint custody as a result of perceived inadequacies inherent in
the sole custody arrangement.27 Part III discusses different approaches
taken by various jurisdictions to the controversial issue of awarding
joint custody over the objection of one parent, 2 and contains an
analysis of Beck v. Beck, 29 the leading case upholding such an order.
Part IV takes the position that because under certain circumstances °
joint custody will serve the best interests of the child," the New
York courts must adopt a flexible approach that will ensure full
consideration of joint custody, even when one party objects. Finally,
this Note recommends that New York join the majority of states
that recognize that under proper circumstances, courts may award
joint custody over the objection of one parent.32 Such an approach
is supported by the following: (1) research indicates that some
parents are ultimately able to separate their marital problems from
their parental duties;33 (2) one parent should not have an automatic
veto power over joint custody;34 and (3) a joint custody award may
help reduce parental conflict in the long run.35
I. The Emergence of Joint Custody
Historically, trends in the law of child custody have reflected
existing social and economic conditions.36 Hence, "[cihanges in so-
cietal attitudes toward children's rights and changing economic con-
ditions have resulted in changes in the legal approach to child
custody. ''31
At early common law in England, for example, courts considered
the father's right to the custody of his minor children superior to
the mother's as a consequence of his obligation to protect, maintain
and educate his children.38 The presumption that a father was entitled
27. See infra notes 57-74.
28. See infra notes 75-161 and accompanying text.
29. 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
30. See infra notes 145-61 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 164 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
36. See Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 351-52.
37. Bratt, Joint Custody, 67 Ky. L.J. 270, 280 (1978-79) [hereinafter Bratt].
38. See State v. Richardson, 40 N.H. 272, 273 (1860); Foster & Freed, Life
With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321, 322 (1978). One commentator has pointed
out that "[iln spite of this presumption in favor of the father with respect to child
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
to custody carried over to the United States, and in the 1800's the
rule in many states was that a father had a right to custody unless
he was demonstratively unfit.3 9 As societal roles of men and women
changed, however, the courts and state legislatures began to reject
this paternal preference.4
In the early 1900's, a number of states enacted legislation that
modified the old common law rule in favor of fathers, 41 and a new
rule, the "tender years doctrine," was born. 42 This doctrine created
a preference for mothers that was equally as strong as the previous
preference for fathers 3.4  Eventually, a presumption arose that a
mother was more fit to assume the custody of the child." The
maternal preference persisted as the dominant rule into the 1970's 5.4
Ultimately, however, because the tender years doctrine was premised
custody, . . , until the end of the nineteenth century, joint custody was awarded
as a matter of course when both parents desired custody." Note, A Presumption
in Favor of Awarding Joint Custody: A Proposal for Legislative Change in New
York, 48 ALB. L. REv. 1073, 1076 (1984) [hereinafter Proposal for Change].
39. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Briggs, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 203, 205 (1834);
People ex rel. Rhoades v. Humphreys, 24 Barb. 521, 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Cayuga
County 1857).
40. Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 351-52. The author has stated:
Numerous factors have been cited to explain these transitions in nineteenth
century custody laws. Urbanization and industrialization forced fathers
to work away from the home and often left child rearing to the mother.
The development of the science of psychology demonstrated that children
need psychological as well as financial support, and that good mothering
produces emotionally healthy children. Finally, the movement for women's
rights coincided with these transitions. It is likely that all of these factors
played some role in loosening-and ultimately reversing-the presumption
favoring paternal custody.
Id.
41. Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J.
FAm. L. 423, 428-29 (1976-77) [hereinafter Tender Years].
42. Id. at 425. The tender years doctrine has been defined as a "blanket judicial
finding of fact, a statement by a court that, until proven otherwise by the weight
of substantial evidence, mothers are always better suited to care for young children
than fathers." State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 180, 350 N.Y.S.2d
285, 287 (Family Ct. N.Y. County 1973).
43. Bratt, supra note 37, at 281 n.43.
44, See, e.g., Cavalleri v. Cavalleri, 37 Misc. 2d 620, 622, 236 N.Y.S.2d 304,
307 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1962). This presumption in favor of the mother stemmed
from her presumed "love and concern for her offspring [which the courts believed
were] the very endowments of her nature." Id.; see also Tender Years, supra note
41, at 425.
45. Note, Fathers and Families: Expanding the Familial Rights of Men, 36
SvACUSE L. REV. 1265, 1273 (1986) [hereinafter Fathers]; see also Joint Custody,
supra note 9, at 353.
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on the assumption that the mother would remain at home while the
father was at work, 46 courts could not justify it once the traditional
roles of husband as provider and wife as homemaker began to
change.47 Accordingly, by the 1980's, most states had eliminated this
maternal preference.4 1
Today, the "best interest of the child" standard -is the near-
universal legal basis for determining custody.4 9 Under this standard,
the court, acting as parens patriae,5 0 must render a decision in the
best interests of the child."
Traditionally, application of the best interest standard has resulted
in awards of sole custody. 2 If both parents are fit and desire custody
of the child, the court will determine which parent is better qualified
to act as the sole custodian. 3 The custodial parent not only retains
46. DISPOSABLE PARENT, supra.note 2, at 36-37; Scott & Derdeyn, Rethinking
Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 455, 460-61 (1984) [hereinafter Rethinking Joint
Custody].
47. Fathers, supra note 45, at 1274 n.71. The author has observed that "[cihanges
in sex roles, as well as equal protection claims brought by fathers, have been
responsible for the rejection of the tender years doctrine" (citing State ex rel.
Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 180-82, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 289-90 (Family Ct.
N.Y. County 1973)). The Watts court concluded that "[a]part from the question
of legality, the 'tender years presumption' should be discarded because it is based
on outdated social stereotypes rather than on rational and up-to-date consideration
of the welfare of the children involved." Id. at 181, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 288.
48. Fathers, supra note 45, at 1274 n.71 (list of states that have rejected the
doctrine); -see also Freed & Foster, Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview,
17 FAm. L.Q. 365, 416 (1984).
49. See Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 354.
50. See Lincoln v. Lincoln, 24 N.Y.2d 270, 272, 247 N.E.2d 659, 660, 299
N.Y.S.2d 842, 843-44 (1969). Parens patriae, " 'literally parent of the country,'
refers traditionally to [the] role of state as sovereign and guardian of persons under
legal disability." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). In standing as
parens patriae, the trial judge "is to put himself in the position of a 'wise,
affectionate and careful parent' and make provision for the child accordingly."
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925) (citation omitted).
51. See Nehra v. Uhlar, 43 N.Y.2d 242, 246, 372 N.E.2d 4, 5, 401 N.Y.S.2d
168, 169 (1977). Though uniformly adopted, the best interest standard has been
criticized as indeterminate and amorphous. See, e.g., Bratt, supra note 37, at 270;
Mnookin, Child Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeter-
minacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 229 (Summer 1975); see also Difficult
Area, supra note 21, at 4, col. 3 ("present system for determining custody of
children of divorce is essentially no system at all").
52. See Note, Joint Custody Awards: Towards the Development of Judicial
Standards, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 105 (1979) [hereinafter Judicial Standards].
53. See, e.g., Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 648, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 406
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978). Such a determination is, in the words of one
commentator; "a perplexing problem that does not lend itself easily to solution
by application of law or legal precedent." Bratt, supra note 37, at 271.
1987]
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physical custody of the child, but also the primary decision-making
authority." A sole custody award is almost always accompanied by
a grant of visitation rights to the non-custodial parent."
In recent years, the practice of generally awarding sole custody
to one parent, with visitation rights to the other, has been sharply
criticized.56 Critics of sole custody have pointed to several problems
inherent in such an arrangement."
First, since sole custody awards place substantial limitations upon
the noncustodial parent's physical access to the child, they tend to
isolate that parent from the child.5" As a result of his or her
diminished parental role, the parent may experience a great sense
of loss,5 9 and withdraw "from the child as a barrier against further
pain. '"60 Second, sole custody awards place significant emotional and
financial burdens on the custodial parent. 6' In short, the custodial
parent must single-handedly do the work normally done by two
parents. 62 Moreover, the child suffers "[blecause the custodial parent
may have great difficulty providing the emotional support required
54. Bratt, supra note 37, at 295. One commentator argues that "[tihe parent
awarded sole custody of the child gains an advantage over the non-custodial parent.
The custodial parent has complete control over the child and his or her decision
has 'priority over the other parent's with regard to the day-to-day upbringing of
the children.' " Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1074 n.8 (citation omitted);
accord Bratt, supra note 37, at 295.
55. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 319. One commentator has stated:
Visitation is usually regarded as a joint right of the noncustodial parent
and the child. It is often referred to as a "natural right" of the non-
custodial parent that may not be taken away absent extraordinary cir-
cumstances showing that it is in the best interests of the child not to
see the parent.
Id. (citations omitted); accord Weiss v. Weiss, 52 N.Y.2d 170, 175, 418 N.E.2d
377, 380, 436 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1981).
56. See supra note 9.
57. See Difficult Area, supra note 21, at 4, col. 2. The authors succinctly stated
that "[t]he problem with a sole-custody award is that it puts heavy logistical,
financial and emotional burdens on the custodial parent, truncates the relationship
of the noncustodial parent with the child and often creates emotional problems
for the child," Id.
58. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 371-72; Joint Custody, supra note
9, at 355-56.
59. See Rethinking Joint Custody, supra note 46, at 459-60; see also Greif,
Fathers, Children and Joint Custody, 49 AM. J. ORTHOPYSCHIATRY 311, 316 (1979)
[hereinafter Fathers, Children].
60. See Fathers, Children, supra note 59, at 316-17; Rethinking Joint Custody,
supra note 46, at 459.
61. See Bratt, supra note 37, at 274-75.
62. See id.
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by a child experiencing the trauma of divorce. ' 63 The ultimate
criticism of sole custody, however, is that, while the award may
have a detrimental effect on the custodial or noncustodial parent,
the person most harmed is the child, in whose best interests the
award was presumably made.
As a result of the perceived inadequacies of sole custody arrange-
ments, 64 joint custody has emerged as a potential alternative. Simply
stated, joint custody "attempts to solve some of the problems of
sole custody by providing the children with access to both parents
and granting parents equal rights and responsibilities regarding their
children. "65
According to its proponents, joint custody is designed to promote
shared parenting for the benefit of both the children and the parents. 66
In giving parents equal rights and responsibilities, joint custody can
allow the child to feel "rooted in relation to both parents and to
continue to value each relationship. ' 67 The child thus has a better
chance to "feel secure in the love and involvement of both parents
as the parents share in the day-to-day upbringing of the child and
in making major decisions affecting the child." 6 Because both parents
can remain actively involved with the child, joint custody avoids
the "absolute nature of sole custody determinations, in which one
parent 'wins' and the other 'loses.' ,,69 Legal recognition of the right
of both parents to participate in their child's life, it is argued, lessens
the sense of loss that usually accompanies a divorce, and makes it
less likely that one parent will have excessive power. 70 The involve-
ment of both parents with their child "adds to the parents' sense
63. Judicial Standards, supra note 52, at 113.
64. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981); Joint Custody,
supra note 9, at 359; Rethinking Joint Custody, supra note 46, at 460; Judicial
Standards, supra note 52, at 113. The Beck court observed that "Ithe use by the
courts of custodial arrangements other than sole custody is not new. In the early
cases of many jurisdictions custody was routinely divided when both parents sought
it." 86 N.J. at 486, 432 A.2d at 65; see also Bratt, supra note 37, at 282 n.45
(list of illustrative cases). Nevertheless, while such arrangements have been permitted
from time to time, "the drive for joint custody" did not begin until the 1970's.
Foster & Freed, Joint-Custody Legislation Finds Firm Support in Majority of States,
Nat'l L.J., Apr. 28, 1986, at 25, col. 1 [hereinafter Legislation].
65. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 486, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981).
66. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 372.
67. DISPOSABLE PARENT, supra note 2, at 120.
68. CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 372.
69. Beck, 86 N.J. at 486, 432 A.2d at 65 (citation omitted).
70. See Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 569-70.
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of self worth and dignity,"'" and the result is a more "natural
sharing of childrearing burdens" with an opportunity for the parents
to "positively balance child care with other essential activities." '7 2
Thus, according to one commentator, joint custody "presents itself
as a ... natural alternative" which "satisfies the normal parental
desire to have [something] more than momentary contact with one's
children ' 73 and in facilitating greater contact between parent and
child, "helps to ensure that each parent fulfills his or her respon-
sibility to the child." '74
III. Differing Approaches to Joint Custody
A. The Majority Approach
The concept of joint custody is now firmly established in most
jurisdictions. 75 At present, thirty-one states have adopted statutes
that expressly authorize joint custody.76 Of these statutes, ten express
a preference for joint custody, 77 while four favor the arrangement
when both parents agree. 78 Three states require the consent of both
71. CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 372.
72. Abraham, A Short Brief for a Rebuttable Presumption in Favor of Joint
Custody 1 (undated) (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office). The remarks
of one mother with joint physical custody of her daughter are illustrative:
I find I can be lovingly responsive, patient, and tactful because I know
I have only 3 1/2 days of explaining how cars work, "how come" banks
don't give free money, why shoes fit left or right, and so on. Haika
and I have few arguments now, and I find I can easily endure them
knowing I'll be relieved by her father on Sunday.
CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 372 n.73 (citing Holly, Joint Custody: The New
Haven Plan, Ms. MAGAZINE 70, 79 (Sept. 1976)).
73. Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 363.
74. Id. at 364.
75. See supra note 17.
76. See supra note 17.
77. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 356; see also CAL. CrV. CODE §§ 4600
(b)(1), 4600.5 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (1981); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.1(6),
598.41(1) (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (Supp. 1986); LA.
CIV. CODE ANN. art. 146(A)(1) (West Supp. 1987); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 208,
§ 31 (Law. Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 125.480(1), (3)(a),
125.490 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 458:17(11), 458:17(111) (1983); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Supp. 1986).
78. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 356; see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-56a(b) (West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (Supp.
1986); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2) (West Supp. 1987); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 93-5-24 (Supp. 1987).
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parents before joint custody may be awarded,7 9 and the remaining
states simply allow joint custody as an option.80 In the absence of
such statutes, "courts may enter orders of joint custody under implied
powers of a general custody statute or under the inherent equitable
powers of the court."'"
While it is clear that jurisdictions differ on the issue of whether
a court may order joint custody over the opposition of a parent,8 2
79. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Anderson 1986); TEx. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(b) (West 1981);
cf. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(g) (Burns Supp. 1986). The Indiana statute
states that in determining whether to award joint custody, "the court shall consider
it a matter of primary, but not determinative importance that the persons awarded
joint custody have agreed to an award of joint legal custody." Id. (emphasis added);
see also In re Marriage of Lampton, 677 P.2d 352, 353 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
(abuse of discretion to award joint custody absent parental agreement), modified,
704 P.2d 847, 850 (Colo. 1985) ("[olnly in the most exceptional cases could an
award of joint custody be warranted . . . in the absence of mutual consent and
agreement by the parties"). Until 1985, Illinois also had a statute which required
the consent of both parents before joint custody could be awarded. See ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, para. 603.1 (Smith-Hurd 1983). In 1985, however, the Illinois legislature
repealed the provision of the statute which required dual consent. ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, para. 602.1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
80. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 356; see also ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.060
(c), 25.20.090, 25.20.100 (1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-1235 (Supp. 1984); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(1) (Supp. 1985);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 602.1, 610(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1987); IND. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-11.5-21(f) (Burns Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(3)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.003[3](b), (d), 518.17[2] (West
Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 40-4-222 to -224 (1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1984); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1275.4B (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(l)(a) (1985);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5304 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
81. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 356 (citing Kerns v. Kerns, 59 Md.
App. 87, 90-94, 474 A.2d 925, 927-29 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) ("implied authority
from general custody statute"); Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 488, 432 A.2d 63, 65
(1981) (general custody statute "evinces a legislative intent to grant courts wide
latitude to fashion creative remedies in matrimonial custody cases"); Dodd v. Dodd,
93 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) ("implied
authority from general custody statute"); Lembach v. Cox, 639 P.2d 197, 200
(Utah 1981) ("equitable powers could serve as basis for joint custody")).
82. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A) (Anderson 1986) (requiring
parental consent) and TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.06(a) (Vernon 1986) (same) and
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(b) (West 1981) (same) with CAL. Civ. CODE § 4600.5
(West Supp. 1987) (expressly authorizing court-ordered joint custody) and HAW.
REv. STAT. § 571-46 (1985) (same) and MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2)
(West Supp. 1987) (same) and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5304 (Purdon Supp. 1987)
(same).
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the majority of states that have addressed the issue allow a court
to order joint custody even if one parent is opposed.13
The decisions upholding joint custody awards over parental op-
position have been justified primarily on the following grounds: (1)
granting one parent a veto power over joint custody is undesirable;8 4
(2) agreement of the parties is merely one factor to be considered
in determining whether a court should order joint custody;85 and
(3) allowing joint custody, even over the opposition of a parent,
preserves the discretionary powers courts have traditionally enjoyed
in custody cases. 86
83. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Iowa 1983)
("[agreement is merely one factor to be considered when joint custody is ordered,
and a change of heart by one or even both parties is not by itself sufficient to
establish a change of circumstances requiring joint custody to be terminated");
Kerns v. Kerns, 59 Md. App. 87, 95, 474 A.2d 925, 929 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984) (affirming joint custody over mother's opposition); Kline v. Kline, 686 S.W.2d
13, 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (stating that a parent should not have veto power
over joint custody, but affirming sole custody for mother because of hostility of
father); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124 N.H. 138, 143, 467 A.2d 249, 251 (1983)
(affirming joint legal custody for mother and step-father and sole physical custody
for step-father despite mother's desire for sole custody); Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J.
480, 498, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (1981) (parent's "opposition to joint custody does not
preclude the court from ordering that arrangement") (emphasis in original); see
also Bratt, supra note 37, at 273; Rethinking Joint Custody, supra note 46, at
457. But see In re Marriage of Lampton, 677 P.2d 352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983)
(award of joint custody absent parental consent is abuse of discretion), modified,
704 P.2d 847, 850 (Colo. 1985) ("[olnly in the most exceptional cases could an
award of joint custody be 'warranted ... in the absence of mutual consent and
agreement by the parties").
84. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Weidner, 338 N.W.2d 351, 356 (Iowa 1983)
("our statutes now express a preference for joint custody over other custodial
arrangements and do not allow one-party vetoes"); Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290,
308, 508 A.2d 964, 973 (1986) ("unwilling to fashion a hard and fast rule that
would have the effect of granting to either parent veto power over the possibility
of a joint custody award"); Kline v. Kline, 686 S.W.2d 13, 17 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984) ("one of the parents should not be able to veto such a court decision by
failure to agree or failure to cooperate with the joint custody determination"). For
a discussion of why the courts should not grant such a veto power, see infra notes
197-99 and accompanying text.
85. See In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 446 (Iowa 1983) (agreement
of parties merely one factor to consider).
86. See, e.g., Kline v. Kline, 686 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("[a]bsent
legislative mandate to the contrary, . . . judges should be given as much latitude
and discretion as possible'); Stanley D. v. Deborah D., 124 N.H. 138, 143, 467
A.2d 249, 251 (1983) (court has discretion to award joint custody when it "would
be in the best interests of the child"). For a discussion of how allowing joint
custody over the objection of one parent preserves the discretionary powers of
courts, see infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
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B. The New York Approach
In sharp contrast to the majority approach, the New York Court
of Appeals has indicated that joint custody should be encouraged
only "as part of a voluntary agreement" between the parties.87
New York law requires that courts determine child custody solely
in the best interests of the child,88 and neither parent has a prima
facie right to custody. 89 No statute expressly provides for an award
of joint custody.90 The New York courts have, however, recognized
their implied power to make such an award under several sections
of the Domestic Relations Law, provided that the award is in the
best interests of the child. 91 Since "[t]here are no absolutes in making
these determinations," 92 the "existence or absence of any one factor
[is] not determinative," 93 and the court must therefore consider the
"totality of the circumstances." ' 94 The court may consider any child
custody agreements that the parents themselves have executed. 95 While
a judge may give weight to such an agreement, prior agreements
87. Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1019, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449, 449 (1978) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
88. See, e.g., McIntosh v. McIntosh, 87 A.D.2d 968, 968, 451 N.Y.S.2d 200,
201 (3d Dep't 1982); Gloria S. v. Richard B., 80 A.D.2d 72, 76, 437 N.Y.S.2d
411, 414 (2d Dep't 1981); Braiman v. Braiman, 61 A.D.2d 995, 1000, 402 N.Y.S.2d
643, 649 (2d Dep't), rev'd on other grounds, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978); Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401,
403 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978); see also N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 70, 240
(McKinney 1977 & 1986). The New York Domestic Relations Law requires that
the court "give such direction, between the parties, for the custody ... of any
child of the parties, as . . .justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of
the case and . . . to the best interests of the child." N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240
(McKinney 1986).
89. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 70, 240 (McKinney 1977 & 1986).
90. See supra note 18.
91. See supra notes 19-20.
92. Eschbach v. Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d 167, 171, 436 N.E.2d 1260, 1262, 451
N.Y.S.2d 658, 660 (1982) (citing Friederwitzer v. Friederwitzer, 55 N.Y.2d 89, 93-
95, 432 N.E.2d 765, 767-68, 447 N.Y.S.2d 893, 895-96 (1982)).
93. Id. at 174, 436 N.E.2d at 1264, 451 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
94. Id.
95. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236B[3](4) (McKinney 1986). The statute pro-
vides:
An agreement by the parties, made before or during the marriage, shall
be valid and enforceable in a matrimonial action .... Such an agreement
may include ... provision for the custody, care, education and main-
tenance of any child of the parties, subject to the provisions of section
two hundred forty of this chapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
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between the parties are not binding on the court. 96 Thus, although
the parents may have agreed to joint custody, the court is not bound
to adopt it. 97
While the parents may agree to joint custody, the courts have
been reluctant to impose it when either parent objects.98 This re-
96. See Eschbach, 56 N.Y.2d at 171, 436 N.E.2d at 1262, 451 N.Y.S.2d at
660-61.
97. See Robinson v. Robinson, 111 A.D.2d 316, 318, 489 N.Y.S.2d 301, 303
(2d Dep't 1985); see also Calder v. Woolverton, 50 A.D.2d 587, 375 N.Y.S.2d 150
(2d Dep't), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 1042, 355 N.E.2d 306, 387 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1976).
Contra MICH. CoMa'. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(2) (West Supp. 1987) (court must award
joint custody if parents agree to it, unless court determines by clear and convincing
evidence that such award is not in best interests of child).
98. See, e.g., Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 590, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021,
407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1978) ("[a]s a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon
already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices
and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos"); Stanat v. Stanat, 93 A,D.2d
114, 461 N.Y.S.2d 32 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 59 N.Y.2d 605, 451 N.E.2d 504,
464 N.Y.S.2d 1025 (1983).
In Stanat, the trial court awarded sole custody to the mother despite its deter-
mination that both parties were fit parents who were " 'concerned for [their] child's
best interests.' " 93 A.D.2d at 115, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 33. On appeal, the father
sought modification of the order to obtain joint custody. The court sustained the
award of sole custody to the mother after commenting that " '[j]oint-custody'
seems to be one of those ideas which are often quite attractive at a distance, but
not quite so, when viewed close up." Id. at 116, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
In a separate opinion, Justice Carro concluded that "joint custody would benefit
the child as well as 'the defeated parent.' " Id. at 120, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (Carro,
J., dubitante). Justice Carro observed that since "[b]oth parents yearn to give their
love and support to th[e] child ... U]oint custody might well dispel the competition
between the parties and, by declaring 'no contest' at all, encourage each to love
and nurture the one good thing remaining from their union." Id. at 120-21, 461
N.Y.S.2d at 36. Nonetheless, Justice Carro joined the majority because, as he
stated, "there should be an end to [this] litigation." Id. at 121, 461 N.Y.S.2d at
36; see also Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 643-44, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402-03
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (despite fact that "both parents have a loving and
close relationship with the children and that both ... are willing and able to
function well as parents," court "must give thought to whether joint custody is
feasible when one party is opposed and court intervention is needed to effectuate
it"). But see Martin v. Martin, 113 A.D.2d 943, 943, 493 N.Y.S.2d 840, 841 (2d
Dep't 1985) (affirming order of joint custody absent parental agreement where
parties relationship "is not so severely antagonistic or embattled as to make [such]
an award . . . improper") (citation omitted).
In a recent survey of attorneys' perceptions and experiences of gender bias in
state courts in New York, respondents reported that joint custody is imposed by
courts over the objections of one or both parents in the following percentages:
ALWAYS OFTEN SOMETIMES RARELY NEVER No ANSWER
* 6 25 27 35 7
See R.L. ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS' PERCEPTIONS OF GENDER BIAs WITHIN THE NEW
YORK STATE JUDICIAL SYSTEM, app. A, at 54 (Dec. 1985) (available at Fordham
19871 JOINT CUSTODY
luctance is not surprising given the language of Braiman v. Braiman,9
the New York Court of Appeals' major pronouncement on the
subject of joint custody. In Braiman, the custody of two minor
children was in dispute.' °0 The mother was initially granted custody
by a divorce judgment which incorporated the terms of the parties'
separation agreement.'01 Upon learning of the mother's plan to leave
the state, however, the father moved to obtain custody of the
children.'0 2 The trial court granted his application, but the appellate
division reversed, awarding custody to the parents jointly. 103 On
appeal, the court of appeals reversed and ordered a new hearing.1°4
The court noted that "[ojn the wisdom of joint custody the au-
thorities are divided."'0 5 Joint custody is desirable, observed the
court, because "children are entitled to the love, companionship and
concern of both parents"' 1 6 and such an arrangement "affords the
otherwise noncustodial parent psychological support which can be
translated into a healthy environment for the child[ren].' ' 17 The
court was persuaded, however, that "[c]hildren need a home base,"10 8
and "[p]articularly where alternating physical custody is directed,"1°9
joint custody may be disruptive, and further the pain of divorce. 10
Urban Law Journal office). The asterisk means less than half of one percent. The
survey, which was commissioned by the New York Task Force on Women in the
Courts, was designed to "collect systematic data" in order to assist the Task Force
in determining the extent to which gender bias may exist in the New York courts.
See Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts, reprinted in
15 FoRDHALQ Ua. L.J. 15, 23-25 & n.23 (1986). One thousand seven hundred and
fifty-nine attorneys responded to the survey which was comprised of questions
relating to such topics as equitable distribution, custody, domestic violence and
juvenile justice. See id. at 23 n.23.
99. 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978); see also Dodd
v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 646, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1978) ("when one parent resists joint custody and refuses to be persuaded that it
is workable, what will be the result for the children when it is ordered by the
Court? There appear to be no social science studies that will answer this question").
100. See 44 N.Y.2d at 587, 378 N.E.2d at 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 449.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 589, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451 (quoting Dodd v.
Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 645-47, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1978)).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108f Id.
109. Id.
110. See id.
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Regarding the Braimans themselves, the court found that, after
more than four years of separation, they were still "unable to manage
their common problems with their children, let alone trust [one
another.""' The parents had continued to find fault with one
another and had failed to work out even a limited visitation ar-
rangement." 2 It was "beyond rational hope," said the court, "[t]o
expect them to exercise the responsibility entailed in sharing" physical
custody of the children." 3 Similarly, "[iut would . . . take more than
reasonable self-restraint to shield the children, as they [went] from
house to house, from the ill feelings, hatred, and disrespect each
parent harbor[ed] towards the other."" 4 Furthermore, since the moth-
er's whereabouts were undisclosed and she was openly intent on
leaving the jurisdiction, the joint custody arrangement imposed by
the appellate division was unfeasible "as a matter of logistics alone."" 5
Because two full years had elapsed since the hearing at special term
and the conflicts and contradictions in the record were "so severe"
and so material," 6 the court found it impossible to resolve the matter
without further assessments of credibility." 7 Accordingly, the court
reversed the appellate division's award of joint custody, and directed
that a new hearing be held."' In dicta, the court stated: "As a
court-ordered arrangement imposed upon already embattled and em-
bittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and wrongs,
[joint custody] can only enhance familial chaos." 19
The court of appeals' decision in Braiman was perhaps fore-
shadowed by Dodd v. Dodd, 20 decided by the Supreme Court of
New York County in 1978. In Dodd, which Braiman cited with
approval, 2' the father had resisted the mother's claim for sole custody
by seeking a joint custody arrangement.1'2 At the outset, the court
observed that joint custody was an "appealing" option 23 because
111. Id. at 590, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 591, 378 N.E.2d at 1022, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 452.
119. Id. at 590, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
120. 93 Misc. 2d 641, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978).
121. See 44 N.Y.2d at 589-90, 378 N.E.2d at 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
122. See 93 Misc. 2d at 642-43, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
123. Id. at 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
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it would allow the court to avoid an "agonizing choice ' 124 and to
avoid the appearance of engaging in gender discrimination.125 In
addition, such an arrangement would protect the self-esteem of both
parents by allowing each "an equal voice in making [child care]
decisions."'12 6 In view of the mother's opposition to joint custody,
however, the court paused to observe that "[w]hile [a court] should
not yield to the frivolous objections of one party, it must give
thought to whether joint custody is feasible when one party is opposed
and court intervention is needed to effectuate it.'1127
After a brief examination of prior joint custody cases in New
York, and a cursory review of the major arguments for and against
it, 128 the court turned to the parties' actual experience with joint
custody. 29 The parents had in fact tried such an arrangement-for
fourteen months they lived apart "without either a separation agree-
ment" or "court order of custody."' 130 During that period, the parents
shared all decisions and, for most of that time, split physical custody
of the children equally.' Conflicts arose, however, over "medical
care and pyschotherapy, over the children's clothing, over discipline,
over money [and] over the children's attendance at family func-
tions. '1 2 Moreover, the children were repeatedly exposed to "angry
words and obscenities" as a result of the overt hostility the parents
displayed towards one another.'33 Psychiatrists called by each of the
parties testified that the joint custody arrangement was not working
well, and the father's own expert stated that the arrangement was
not only stressful for the children, but was in fact "unworkable.' 34
Accordingly, the court awarded sole custody to the mother, with
liberal visitation rights to the father."'
124. Id.
125. Id. One commentator has argued that since the mother is awarded sole
custody in a high percentage of cases brought before the trial courts in New York,
and such decisions are rarely reversed on appeal, "legislation creating an express
presumption in favor of awarding joint custody is necessary . . . to eliminate the
tendency to award custody on the basis of ... gender." Proposal for Change,
supra note 38, at 1073-74.
126. 93 Misc. 2d at 643, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 402.
127. Id.
128. See id. at 644-46, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04.
129. See id. at 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 648, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
135. See id. at 650-51, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 407. On its facts, the result in Dodd
1987]
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Taken together, Braiman and Dodd signify that while the New
York courts recognize an implied statutory right to order joint
custody if it is in the best interests of the child, the courts remain
reluctant to do So.136 The courts will not award joint custody if the
appears to be legally sound. It is difficult to quarrel with the court's conclusion
that joint custody is ill-advised when "one parent resists joint custody and refuses
to be persuaded that it is workable." Id. at 646, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (emphasis
added); cf. Foster & Freed, Joint Custody-A Viable Alternative?, N.Y.L.J., Dec.
22, 1978, at 3, col. 1 (joint custody should not be awarded where "each party is
unalterably opposed") [hereinafter Viable Alternative].
The problem, however, is that Dodd has been interpreted broadly as in effect
holding that joint custody will not work unless both parents have agreed to it.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The court's statement that "[it is
hardly surprising that joint custody is generally arrived at by consent," 93 Misc.
2d at 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 405, is central to the New York Court of Appeals'
reasoning in Braiman, that "joint custody is encouraged primarily as a voluntary
alternative." 44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449,
451 (1978) (citation omitted). For a contrasting approach, see Beck v. Beck, 86
N.J. 480, 498, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (1981) (parental "opposition to joint custody does
not preclude the court from ordering that arrangement) (emphasis in original). See
supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 166-206 and
accompanying text.
As a result of the Braiman and Dodd decisions, the New York courts have. been
reluctant to impose joint custody as a court-ordered arrangement upon litigants.
See supra note 98.
136. See supra note 21. In response, recent efforts have been made to encourage
joint custody awards by legislation. One commentator notes that while "the leg-
islature has yet to enact any statute expressly mandating or even suggesting that
the courts consider such an award, [p]roposals creating a presumption in favor of
joint custody have . . . been introduced on many occasions over the past four
years." Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1093; see id. at 1093 n.134 (citing
N.Y.A. 4166-C, 204th Sess. (1981); N.Y.A. 10721, 205th Sess. (1982); N.Y.A. 9369,
203rd Sess. (1980)).
Notably, as a corollary to the latter bill, "the legislature proposed amending
section 240 of New York's Domestic Relations Law to allow the courts to award
joint custody even if one parent opposed such an arrangement." Proposal for
Change, supra note 38, at 1098. To effectuate such an award, "[tihe court would
issue a decree directing the parents to act in accordance with the court's order
with respect to the custody, care, education and maintenance of the child." Id.
(footnote omitted). In fact, none of the joint custody bills proposed by the legislature
between 1980 and 1982 conditioned such an award on parental agreement. See
Second Thoughts, supra note 21, at 576-77.
Though N.Y.A. 9369 was passed by the New York Assembly in April, 1980,
the bill ultimately "died in [the Senate Judiciary] Committee." Proposal for Change,
supra note 38, at 1097-98 n.150; see Second Thoughts, supra note 26, at 576-77.
The bills proposed in 1981 and 1982, though similar, were "much more conservative"
than N.Y.A. 9369. See Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1096 n.149. In
that Note the author stated:
In the 1980-1981 session of the New York Legislature, a bill was
proposed which would have prohibited any prima facie right to sole
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parties are hostile towards one another, even though "both parents
custody and would have allowed for a presumption in favor of joint
custody. A later bill was proposed in the 1981-1982 session. Under this
bill the courts would have been prevented from denying an award of
joint custody if both parents agreed to it in writing or before the court
of record unless the court did so with just and reasonable cause. If the
court did reject such an agreement, the court would have had to spe-
cifically cite the facts that would require a denial. Both of these bills
.were vetoed by Governor Carey.
Governor Carey vetoed N.Y.A. 4166-C, 204th Sess. (1981), for two
reasons. First, the bill would have created a legal presumption that joint
custody is in the best interests of the child. Governor Carey felt that
such a presumption should not be enacted into law merely because joint
custody is not expressly precluded by § 240 of the Domestic Relations
Law. Second, Governor Carey was of the opinion that joint custody, if
awarded, would never be in the child's best interests if the parents were
hostile or antagonistic. The bill, however, would have provided that joint
custody . . . be awarded where either party had applied for such an
award at any stage of the proceedings.
The Governor vetoed N.Y.A. 10721, 205th Sess. (1982), because the
bill would have required the courts to give joint custody first consideration
... . As a result of the introduction of the bill and the extensive
opposition to its proposal the Governor requested the [New York] Law
Revision Commission to study New York common law and statutes to
assess the needs for reform and to make recommendations with respect
to proposed changes in the law. The Law Revision Commission's [interim]
report, [which] was submitted to Governor Carey on December 23, 1982
• . . made two recommendations: (1) present law on joint custody should
not be codified or changed by legislation at this time; any future legislation
should be considered only in the context of a study of the entire custody
decision-making process; and (2) the laws concerning the custody decision-
making process should be studied to determine whether the best interests
of the child are now being satisfactorily met; ... the role of an award of
joint custody would be an important part of such a broad-based study.
While the Commission did acknowledge that problems do arise under
a sole custody award, it would not encourage the statutory enactment
of a presumption in favor of joint custody for several reasons. First, it
noted that problems might also arise in a joint custody arrangement:
parents might not be able to cooperate in the decision-making process,
the award might be disruptive to the child in terms of inconsistency of
discipline and conflicts of loyalty, and such an award might be used by
a judge to avoid a complex and difficult fact-finding task. Second, the
Commission . . . pointed out that the courts are free to award joint
custody if such an award would be in the best interests of the child
despite the absence of an express provision providing for such an award ....
Id. at 1096-97 n. 149 (citations omitted).
The Commission's concern that a statutory presumption might inhibit meticulous
fact-finding by judges has been echoed by other commentators. See, e.g., Difficult
Area, supra note 21, at 4, col. 2. The authors argue that legislation must "spell
out the factors to be considered by the court with respect to joint custody and
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
have a loving and close relationship with the children and . .. are
willing and able to function well as parents." '137 The courts appear
to assume that hostile parents are unable to agree about even minor
issues, and thus should be deemed incapable of working together
to make major decisions affecting the child.' Implicitly, "the courts
have determined that the overriding factor in awarding joint custody
is the amicability of the parents rather than [the quality of] the
relationship between parent and child.' 1 39
require the trial judge to articulate his [or her] reasoning with respect to each in
reaching his [or her] ultimate conclusion." Id. The authors endorse such an approach
because:
Specifying the factors to be considered and requiring the trial judge to
make specific findings as to each, [thus "abjuring any presumptions"],
... gives the greatest assurance that the decision for or against joint
custody will stem from reason rather than predilection, from learning
rather than leaning, in short, . . . the best interest of the child.
Id. at 4, cols. 2-3; see also Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 488, 432 A.2d 63, 66
(1981) ("despite our belief that joint custody will be the preferred disposition in
some matrimonial actions, we decline to establish a presumption in its favor or
in favor of any particular custody determination"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.26a (West Supp. 1987) (listing factors that court must consider in determining
"whether joint custody is in the best interests of the child"); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.17[21 (West Supp. 1987) (also specifying factors that court must consider);
Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 577.
The Commission completed its study of child custody in 1984, and recommended
legislation aimed at creating "a uniform statewide child custody dispute resolution
system which encouraged the settlement of custody disputes rapidly, voluntarily,
and without adversary litigation, and which fosters the involvement of both parents
in the post-divorce emotional and financial support of the child." STATE OF NEW
YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1985, 174. Among other
things, the Commission hoped "that its recommended changes in the procedure
for resolving custody disputes . . . [would] lead to an increasing number of voluntary
joint custody arrangements." Id. at 177. Bills were introduced upon the recom-
mendation of the Commission in 1985 in both the Senate and the Assembly. Neither
bill, however, was reported out of committee. STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF
THE LAW REVISION COMMISSION FOR 1986, 37.
137. See Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 644, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 403 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978); see also Seago v. Arnold, 91 A.D.2d 835, 836, 458 N.Y.S.2d
427, 428 (4th Dep't 1982).
138. See Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1082 n.64 (citations omitted).
Concededly, there are circumstances in which the level of hostility and lack of
ability to cooperate between the parties is so intense that joint custody is inap-
propriate. See infra note 184. Unfortunately, however, the New York courts have
yet to even attempt to provide a framework of analysis for determining those
circumstances. For an example of such a framework, see Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J.
480, 498, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (1981) ("potential for cooperation should not be assessed
in the 'emotional heat' of the divorce"). For an analysis of this approach, see
supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text and infra notes 139-61 and accompanying
text.
139. Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1081 (citing Braiman v. Braiman,
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C. The New Jersey Approach: The Innovations of Beck
Beck v. Beck,140 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court in
1981, is the leading case upholding an order of joint custody over
the objection of one parent.141 The opinion has been described as
a "landmark custody decision" which may be "a harbinger of things
to come in other jurisdictions. ' 1 42
In Beck, the court ruled that although New Jersey's general custody
statute does not specifically authorize an award of joint custody,
the court possesses "wide latitude to fashion creative remedies in
matrimonial custody cases," 1 43 including joint custody decrees.'" The
decision is significant because it sets forth explicit guidelines for
courts to use in determining whether to award joint custody. 145 The
factors a court should consider prior to entering an order of joint
custody are: (1) both parents must be fit; 46 (2) both parents must
desire continuing involvement with their child; 47 (3) the child should
view both parents as a source of security and love; 4 and (4) both
parents must exhibit potential for cooperation in raising the child. 49
44 N.Y.2d 584, 589-90, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 450-51 (1978);
Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 899, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d Dep't 1980);
Bergson v. Bergson, 68 A.D.2d 931, 932, 414 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (2d Dep't 1979)).
The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected such an approach in Beck, 86
N.J. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71-72. The Beck court stated that the requirement that
parents "exhibit a potential for cooperation in matters of child rearing . . .does
not translate into a requirement that the parents have an amicable relationship."
Id. Rather, "a successful joint custody arrangement requires only that the parents
be able to isolate their personal conflicts from their roles as parents and that the
children be spared whatever resentments and rancor the parents may harbor.',' Id.
(citation omitted); accord Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 550 ("[a]lthough
there has been a frequent suggestion that joint custody can work only for couples
with an amicable relationship, the pertinent inquiry should be whether the parents
are able to isolate their marital conflicts from their role as parents") (footnote
omitted).
140. 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
141. See id. at 488, 432 A.2d at 66.
142. Proceedings, supra note 23, at 1, col. 3.
143. Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 485, 432 A.2d 63, 65 (1981).
144. Id.
145. See infra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
146. 86 N.J. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71 (citation omitted). According to the court,
fit means "physically and psychologically capable of fulfilling the role of [a] parent."
Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. According to one commentator, "[t]he factors discussed in Beck have
been adopted by courts in several other jurisdictions." CHILD CUSTODY, supra note
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With regard to the fourth requirement, the opinion represents a
clear departure from the joint custody decisions of other jurisdic-
tions. 50 Beck expressly holds that parents need not have an amicable
relationship in order for joint custody to work, rather, the parties
need only "be able to isolate their personal conflicts from their
roles as parents.""'' If the potential for cooperation does exist, the
court should "encourage its activation by instructing the parents on
what is expected of them." '52 Moreover, "the potential for coop-
eration should not be assessed in the 'emotional heat' of the di-
vorce."'5 Rather, the critical determination is whether the parents,
outside the context of the litigation, "have each demonstrated that
they are reasonable and are willing to give priority to the best interest
of their child.' ' 5
4
In concluding that the relevant inquiry is simply whether the parents
can put aside their personal conflicts to cooperate for the benefit
of their children, the Beck court directly challenges one of the major
arguments raised against joint custody-parents who were unable to
maintain their marriage cannot achieve the high degree of coop-
10, at 366 n.5 (citing Strosnider v. Strosnider, 101 N.M. 639, 645, 686 P.2d 981,
987 (Ct. App. 1984); In re Wesley J.K., 299 Pa. Super. 504, 506, 445 A.2d 1243,
1249 (1982)).
The second factor enumerated in Beck-that each parent be willing to accept
custody-is a threshold requirement for joint custody, because "[ilf one parent,
though fit, does not wish to be actively involved in raising the child following
divorce, there is little reason to go further." Joint Custody of Children, supra
note 7, at 580.
The Beck court conceded that "the necessary elements [for an award of joint
custody] will coalesce only infrequently." 86 N.J. at 497, 432 A.2d at 71. Yet,
despite this caveat, the opinion presents a positive view of joint custody, which
demands that judges take an active role in facilitating its application. See id. at
498-99, 432 A.2d at 72.
150. See, e.g., Moninger v. Moninger, 202 Neb. 494, 499, 276 N.W.2d 100, 103
(1979) (both parents fit, but "alternating" custody not in child's best interest given
"strenuous tug of war for custody"); Fuhrman v. Fuhrman, 254 N.W.2d 97, 100
(N.D. 1977) (joint custody "unworkable" because parents "unable to cooperate
with each other well enough to make it work"); Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529,
531-32, 394 A.2d 1139, 1141-42 (1978) (expressing doubt that parents who litigate
custody can "collaborate in the interest of their [children]" and concluding that
"joint custody should only be decreed in cases where there is a finding of extra-
ordinary circumstances").
151.-86 N.J. 480, 498, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (1981); see infra notes 179-84 and
accompanying text.
152. Beck, 86 N.J. at 499, 432 A.2d at 72 (quoting Joint Custody of Children,
supra note 7, at 580).
153. Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 72 (emphasis added).
154. Id. (quoting Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 580).
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eration demanded by joint custody."' The essence of the criticism
is that "the requirements of joint custody are inherently contrary
to the fact of divorce, in that even the most mature and sophisticated
divorcees harbor substantial resentment against one another."'15 6 Since
joint custody requires a high-degree of interaction in making child-
care decisions, it is argued that parental conflict would' be heightened
in such an arrangement. 5 7 The Beck court conceded that the re-
quirement that parents be able to cooperate in matters of childrearing
is "the most troublesome aspect of a joint custody decree."' 58 The
essence of the decision, however, is that many parents are quite
able to isolate their marital problems from their parental respon-
sibilities,'5 9 and when the parents exhibit a spirit of cooperation
towards childrearing, an award of joint custody will foster the child's
relationship with both parents despite the parents' personal antag-
onism towards one another.' 60 Implicitly, a "spirit of cooperation
is evident where parents wish to promote their child's best inter-
ests.'" 6'
IV. Recommendation For New York Courts
This Note maintains that the current New York approach to joint
custody is unduly restrictive, and thus inhibits full consideration of
155. Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 367. One commentator has stated:
Opponents of joint custody advance two primary arguments: (1) joint
custody is contrary to a child's need for stability and continuity-con-
ditions that opponents say can be offered by a single custodial envi-
ronment, but not by a joint custody arrangement and (2) parents who
could not cooperate to save their marriage are not likely to be able to
cooperate in a joint custody arrangement.
CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 373. The latter argument is articulated in a
recent opinion of the Vermont Supreme Court which observed:
Joint custody, more often than not, creates more problems than it resolves
regardless of the initial good intentions of the parties. It should be
decreed only where there is a finding of extraordinary circumstances;
rarely is it in the best interests of the innocent victims of divorce, the
children. The same inability of the parties to resolve their own domestic
difficulties between themselves "also indicates that the possibility of a
cooperative custody solution is usually remote."
Korshak v. Korshak, 140 Vt. 547, 550, 442 A.2d 464, 466 (1982) (citations omitted)
(quoted in CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 374).
156. Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 367.
157. See CHILD CUSTODY, supra note 10, at 365. For a differing view, see infra
notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
158. 86 N.J. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71.
159. See id. at 492, 432 A.2d at 68; see also infra note 171.
160. Beck, 86 N.J. at 498-99, 432 A.2d at 66, 71-72.
161. Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1090; see also DISPOSABLE PARENT,
supra note 2, at 116; Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 580.
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joint custody as a viable alternative to sole custody arrangements.
This restrictive approach is attributable, in large part, to the "es-
sentially negative and pessimistic" tenor of Braiman, which has had
a "chilling effect on lower courts. 1 62
Concededly, joint custody is not a cure-all. The feasibility of joint
custody turns on the presence of factors that, as the Beck court
has observed, will "coalesce only infrequently." 163 When these factors
do coalesce, however, joint custody is likely to foster "the best
interest of the child," because "it achieves for the [child] a close
[ap]proximation of the life [he or she] enjoyed before the parental
breakup.' 164 Thus, in order to fulfill the intent of the Domestic
Relations Law that child custody be determined solely in the best
interests of the child,165 the New York courts must adopt a flexible
approach that will ensure that courts fully consider joint custody
162. Rulings Compared, supra note 21, at 3, col. 2. The author has stated:
There is no question but that the essentially negative tenor of the
Braiman case has had a very definite chilling effect on lower courts
prompting them, with a few notable exceptions, to reject or reverse
awards of joint custody for the flimsiest of reasons.
In this regard, more than any other single statement in the Braiman
case, the contention that joint custody "is insupportable when parents
are severely antagonistic and embattled" has encouraged lower courts to
dismiss joint custody applications generally with nothing more than terse
references to "hostility" "acrimony" or "sharp differences" between the
parties.
Id. (citing Bliss v. Ach, 86 A.D.2d 575, 575, 446 N.Y.S.2d 305, 305 (1st Dep't
1982); Munford v. Shaw, 84 A.D.2d 810, 811, 444 N.Y.S.2d 137, 139 (2d Dep't
1981); Salamone v. Salamone, 83 A.D.2d 778, 779, 443 N.Y.S.2d 464, 465-66 (4th
Dep't 1981); Cmaylo v. Cmaylo, 76 A.D.2d 898, 899, 429 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d
Dep't 1980); Bergson v. Bergson, 68 A.D.2d 931, 932, 414 N.Y.S.2d 593, 594 (2d
Dep't 1979); Ackerman v. Ackerman, N.Y.L.J., May 3, 1982, at 43, col. 6 (Sup.
Ct. Queens County)); see Difficult Area, supra note 21, at 1, col. 3. The authors
of this article have observed:
Prior to Braiman, joint custody had been considered and awarded in a
number of trial-term decisions. Since the Braiman decision, joint custody
has been approved at the appellate level in two cases but rejected in
eight. The two acceptances cannot be characterized as ringing endorse-
ments, however, for in one, ... the appellate division noted that "except
for shared legal responsibility, the award of joint custody was, in effect,
a grant of sole custody to plaintiff with liberal visitation rights to the
defendant," and in the other, . . . the award was of custody to the
mother during the school year and the father during the summer recess.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
163. 86 N.J. 480, 497, 432 A.2d 63, 71 (1981). See supra notes 146-49 and
accompanying text.
164. Legislation, supra note 64, at 27, col. 4.
165. See supra note 88.
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as an option to the traditional award of sole custody. One way to
accomplish this goal is to follow the lead of Beck and the majority
of states that have addressed the issue, and recognize that under
certain circumstances, a court may award joint custody over the
objection of one parent.'6
Courts should award joint custody even over the objection of one
parent because: (1) studies indicate that a parent's initial anger and
lack of cooperation at the beginning of a divorce will often dissipate
with the passage of time; 167 (2) one parent should not have an
automatic veto power over joint custody; 68 (3) allowing joint custody,
even over the opposition of a parent, preserves the discretionary
powers courts have traditionally had in custody cases;' 69 and (4) a
joint custody order may help reduce parental conflict in the long
run. 170
A. Anger Dissipates Over Time
Studies conducted by social scientists indicate that the initial anger
and refusal to cooperate during the divorce process that parents
may experience is often transitory and will subside over time.' 7' This
is even more likely to occur when parents share common values
regarding childrearing, 72 or when they have had a history of co-
operation. 73 Such was the case in In re Wesley J.K. '74 in which
166. See supra notes 75-86 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 171-85 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 200-06 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 186-95 and accompanying text.
171. Atkinson, Commentary Regarding the Revised Draft of the Model Joint
Custody Statute 5 (Aug. 21, 1986) (ABA Revised Draft of Model Joint Custody
Statute and Commentary thereto, available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office)
[hereinafter Commentary]; see, e.g., Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at
552 & n.179 ("in studying the relationship that exists between divorced parents
who are participating jointly in raising their children, one researcher concluded
that the parents studied had the ability 'to continue a co-parenting relationship
while terminating, both legally and emotionally, a spousal relationship' ") (quoting
Ahrons, The Coparental Divorce: Preliminary Research Findings and Policy Im-
plications 13) (unpublished paper presented at the annual meeting of National
Council on Family Relations, Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 19-22, 1978); Part-time Fathers,
supra note 3, at 64-76 (study based on extensive interviews with eight separated
or divorced men who have physical custody of children) ("it is difficult to point
precisely to the combination of factors that helped fathers and their ex-wives separate
their relationsbip as spouses from their relationship as parents").
172. See Part-time Fathers, supra note 3, at 75.
173. See Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 493 n.6, 432 A.2d 63, 69 n.6 (1981).
174. 299 Pa. Super. 504, 445 A.2d 1243 (1982).
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the'Superior Court of Pennsylvania took issue with the trial court's
decision to award sole custody. 171 In remanding the case for further
consideration, the court indicated its approval of awarding joint
custody over the objection of the mother because the parents had
cooperated well during periods of separation. 76 The court, which
adopted the Beck standards for determining when joint custody is
appropriate,177 concluded that while a voluntary agreement is pref-
erable, joint custody may be awarded over the objection of one
parent when "the record indicates an ability [of the parties'] to
place the interests of the child before their own."' 78
Similarly, in Beck, 79 the court's affirmance of the trial court's
decision to award joint custody was influenced by its observation
that "the problem of noncooperation arose only in the wake of the
initial joint custody decree,"' 80 and that "[t]he parties cooperated
satisfactorily in the pre-divorce visitation routine." 8, This observation
provides the basis for what is perhaps the major innovation of Beck:
the idea that the "potential for [parental] cooperation should not
be assessed in the 'emotional heat' of divorce.' ' 82 Analytically, this
is the key to the court's reasoning that parents need not have an
amicable relationship to qualify for joint custody, but must only
"be able to isolate their personal conflicts from their roles as
parents."' 83 In assessing the parents' potential for cooperation outside
of the divorce setting, as opposed to the "emotional heat" of the
divorce, a court can make a more objective determination of whether
175. See id. at 510-11, 445 A.2d at 1246.
176. See id. at 516-17, 445 A.2d at 1249 (court noted that since "both parents
are fit, . . . desire continuing involvement with their child, . . are seen by the
child as sources of love, and ... are able to communicate and cooperate in
promoting the child's best interests, . . . [the] situation [is] a particularly strong
one for ... a [joint] custody arrangement").
177. See supra notes 145-49 and accompanying text'
178. 299 Pa. Super. at 515, 445 A.2d at 1248.
179. 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
180. Id. at 493 n.6, 432 A.2d at 69 n.6.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 72 (emphasis added).
183. Id. at 498, 432 A.2d at 71; see also In re Marriage of Bolin, 336 N.W.2d
441, 446 (Iowa 1983) ("[ajlthough cooperation and communication are essential in
joint custody, tension between the parents is not alone sufficient to demonstrate
it will not work"); Doe v. Doe, 16 Mass. App. Ct. 499, 502, 452 N.E.2d 293,
295 (1983) ("[wjhile conflict between the parties does in fact exist, the record before
us identifies that conflict as concerning the relationship of the husband and the
wife with each other and their inability to communicate. It does not involve specific
areas of disagreement regarding [the child's] care, custody and upbringing").
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joint custody would be in the best interests of the child. Moreover,
such an approach ensures that a court will give joint custody full
consideration as an alternative to sole custody, because Beck requires
that the judge "look for the parents' ability to cooperate and, if
the potential exists, encourage its activation by instructing the parents
on what is expected of them."''8 4
Given the recognition that, for some parents, the anger they may
feel during the initial stages of a divorce litigation will dissipate
over time, it is particularly undesirable to effectively preclude joint
custody at the beginning of a case by giving one parent an automatic
veto power. '
184. 86 N.J. at 498-99, 432 A.2d at 72 (citation omitted). Clearly, however, if
parents lack the ability to cooperate or if the level of hostility is extreme, and
likely to remain that way, joint custody will not be feasible. See, e.g., Rolde v.
Rolde, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 399, 405, 425 N.E.2d 388, 389, 392 (1981) (" 'joint
custody or shared responsibility is an invitation to continued warfare and conflict'
where the parties are severely antagonistic and embittered toward each other")
(citation omitted); Heard v. Heard, 353 N.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(error to award joint custody where parties "were unable to communicate and ...
negotiations even on such matters as telephone calls by the children sometimes
resulted in abusive behavior"); Braiman v. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 590, 378
N.E.2d 1019, 1021, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449, 451 (1978) ("[a]s a court-ordered arrangement
imposed upon already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of
serious vices and wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos"); Worowski v.
Worowski, 95 A.D.2d 687, 687, 463 N.Y.S.2d 798, 798 (1st Dep't 1983) (abuse
of discretion to award joint custody given "background of continuing marital
turmoil"); Dodd v. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641, 647, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1978) (request for joint custody denied where "parties . . .made
child rearing a battleground").
Similarly, some courts have refused to award joint custody when the parents
lacked shared values regarding childrearing. See Kincaide v. Kincaide, 444 So. 2d
651, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1983) ("irreconcilable differences . . . concerning the child's
attending private religious school and other matters"); see also Steinman, Zem-
melman & Knoblauch, A Study of Parents Who Sought Joint Custody Following
Divorce: Who Reaches Agreement and Sustains Joint Custody and Who Returns
to Court, 24 J. Am. AcAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 554, 561-62 (1985). The authors,
who studied 51 families with joint custody, observed the following characteristics
of families for whom joint custody was successful:
(1) relatively low degrees of anger; (2) the ability to control aggression;
(3) high self-esteem; (4) only mild depression about the break-up; and
(5) respect for the ex-spouses' role as a parent. By contrast, the typical
parent in the failed group possessed: (1) intense anger; (2) a strong
tendency to blame the ex-spouse for the break-up; (3) a low sense of
self-worth; (4) a rigid personality; and (5) deep mistrust of the other
parent.
Id.
185. See infra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
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B. Joint Custody May Ultimately Reduce Parental Conflict
For some parties, "the existence of a joint custody order may
help reduce conflict since a parent who might otherwise have been
the non-custodial parent will not feel like [a] visitor with second-
class rights.1 s6 To the extent a party feels that he or she is being
treated as an equal, the party may "have less desire for a power
struggle.'"
7
For example, in a recent California study of 414 custody cases,
researchers concluded that "the custody arrangement most beneficial
in terms of lack of subsequent parental conflict is joint custody."' 8
Of the 414 cases the authors studied, 276 involved sole custody,
and 138 involved joint custody. 89
The authors evaluated the success of the two types of arrangements
by comparing respective rates of relitigation following the initial
186. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6; see also DISPOSABLE PARENT, supra note
2, at 116-17; Proposal for Change, supra note 38, at 1087. The author has stated:
There have been relatively few studies concerning the effects of divorce
on children. Roman and Haddad, however, discussed the results of a
California and Virginia study in depth. These studies evaluated the effects
of the sole custody awards on children over a period of years following
divorce. The California study attempted to show the effects of sole
custody on the children involved. All of these children were negatively
effected by living in a single-parent home. This was especially evident
where there was conflict between the parents. The study concluded that
this conflict could only be alleviated through an award of joint custody.
In fact, this same study asserted that sole custody has a more harmful
effect upon the child than does joint custody because children who are
part of a sole custody [arrangement] ... fear that the non-custodial
parent will [ultimately] abandon them.
[The study found] several reasons for the increased conflict between
parents where sole custody has been awarded. Often .... the relationship
between the child and the custodial parent becomes tenuous within one
year of the divorce. [Hence], [t]he child generally develops a closer
relationship with the non-custodial parent. Apparently, the custodial par-
ent is over burdened with the responsibility for the child and is filled
with anxiety. The non-custodial parent, however, is able to "woo" the
child with trips and other outings. Later, the non-custodial parent tends
to withdraw [feeling that] he or she has lost meaningful contact with
the child. [Thus] one parent feels overly burdened and anxious, [and]
the other is left with a sense of loss.
Id. at 1087 n.94 (citations omitted).
187. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6; see also Joint Custody of Children,
supra note 7, at 551.
188. Rulings Compared, supra note 21, at 4, col. 3 (citing Ilfeld, Ilfeld &
Alexander, Does Joint Custody Work? A First Look at Outcome Data of Reli-
tigation, 139 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 63 (1982)).
189. See id.
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custody determinations. 190 "Agreement between the parents accounted
for ninety-one percent of the sole custody awards and eighty-six
percent of the joint custody awards."' 191
The study revealed significantly less relitigation in the joint custody
cases-sixteen percent-than in the sole custody cases-thirty-two
percent. 192 " 'These proportions,' " observe the authors, " 'are
significantly different . . . and suggest that joint custody results in
less parental conflict and implicitly, in lower child distress than in
[sole] custody.' ''193
Significantly, "as for the group in which joint custody was awarded
over the objection of one of the parents, the rate of relitigation
was no greater than that for the sole custody group." 9 4 Consequently,
the authors suggest that "unconsented joint custody is no more
disruptive in terms of parental conflict than [sole] custody."' 95
C. One Parent Should Not Have an Automatic Veto Power
Although a parent's opposition to joint custody is a factor a court
should seriously consider before entering such an order,'196 one parent
190. See id.
191. Id.
192. See id.; see also Joint Custody of Children, supra note 7, at 572 ("some
evidence based on judicial experience that [fewer], not more modification battles
result from decrees of joint custody").
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.; see also Beck, 86 N.J. at 498 n.9, 432 A.2d at 71 n.9 ("[a]lthough
joint custody may be less likely to succeed if ordered by the court than if achieved
by the parents' agreement, court-ordered joint custody is likely to be no more
prone to failure than court-ordered sole custody following a divorce custody pro-
ceeding") (citation omitted).
196. The majority of states that have addressed the issue allow a court to award
joint custody, even over the objection of one parent. See supra notes 75-86 and
accompanying text. By legislation, however, Ohio, Texas and Wisconsin expressly
require the consent of both parents. See supra note 79; see also Dodd v. Dodd,
93 Misc. 2d 641, 643, 646-47, 403 N.Y.S.2d 401, 402 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978)
(observing that "[w]hile the court should not yield to the frivolous objections of
one party, it must give thought to whether joint custody is feasible when one party
is opposed and court intervention is necessary to effectuate it" and expressing
doubt where "one parent resists joint custody and refuses to be persuaded that it
is workable"); cf. Viable Alternative, supra note 135, at 3, col. 1 ("joint custody
should be rejected ... where [ejach party is unalterably opposed").
In an attempt to develop more consistency in the area of joint custody, the
American Bar Association's Family Law Section is in the process of drafting a
model joint custody statute. According to the Commentary to the latest draft, the
question of "whether joint custody should ever be ordered if one parent opposes
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should not have an automatic veto power over joint custody. Al-
lowing one parent the unilateral power to avoid an order of joint
custody by withholding consent can unfairly affect the rights of the
parties. 97 For example, a parent might withhold consent to joint
custody as leverage to gain advantage on other issues, such as support
and property settlements. 98 Allowing joint custody over parental
opposition will thus discourage parents from using lack of consent
to such an arrangement as a "bargaining chip" in divorce negoti-
ations. Moreover, by refusing to allow an automatic parental veto,
the court will properly focus the determination of the best interests
of the child on the child, and not on issues primarily related to the
parents' personal interests.199
[it]" is "[o]ne of the most controversial issues which developed in drafting [the]
statute." Commentary, supra note 171, at 5. The drafters were "sharply divided":
[T]he issue of parental consent was vigorously debated. Those who would
require consent of both parents advance several arguments. First, they
argue that if parents are antagonistic enough to litigate the issue of joint
custody, they probably are too antagonistic for joint custody to work.
They point to studies which indicate a relatively high rate of relitigation
of joint custody cases (although other studies report lower rates of
relitigation of joint custody compared [with] sole custody).
Second, those who believe joint custody should only be allowed if
both parents agree to it [also] claim that some parents will use a request
for joint custody as [an] improper bargaining chip on property and
support issues.... [Tihe argument ... is that a parent who should not
receive joint custody will nonetheless seek it as a way to pressure the
other parent to give in on property and support issues. Under this line
of reasoning, a parent who should have sole custody might consent to
a less than fair share of property and support in exchange for the other
parent dropping a request for joint custody.
Id. at 5, 6-7. For a discussion of the rationale for allowing courts to order joint
custody over the objection of one parent, see supra notes 171-95 and accompanying
text; infra notes 197-206 and accompanying text.
197. See Commentary, supra note 171, at 5.
198. See id. According to the Commentary the counter-argument is "that a parent
who should not receive joint custody will nonetheless seek it as a way to pressure
the other parent to give in on property and support issues." Id. at 6. That is, "a
parent who should have sole custody might consent to less than a fair share of
property and support in exchange for the other parent dropping a request for joint
custody." However:
[Tihere is a significant difference. If the joint custody statute allows
parental veto over joint custody, a judge has no discretion to correct
the use of a denial of permission for joint custody as an improper
bargaining chip. On the other hand, if the statute allows a judge discretion
to order joint custody and a parent improperly seeks joint custody, the
judge has discretion to deny joint custody and still award an appropriate
amount of property and support.
Id. at 6-7.
199. New York law requires that child custody be determined solely in the best
interests of the child. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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D. Preserving the Court's Discretionary Powers
Allowing joint custody over the objection of one parent "preserves
the discretionary powers which courts have traditionally had in
custody cases. ' ' 200 As noted above, the feasibility of joint custody
will depend on an individualized determination of such factors as
whether both parents are fit, the ability of the parents to cooperate,
and the quality of the parent-child relationships involved. 20 ' Because
of the need for individualized determinations, courts should not
arrive at custody arrangements by applying "rigid rules, such as [an
automatic] parental veto over joint custody." 20 2 Instead, courts should
"exercise sound discretion after [careful] consideration of appropriate
factors. 203 Moreover, in order to ensure full consideration of joint
custody as an option, courts should be required to make findings
of fact in support of their ultimate custody decisions.
204
In short, allowing a parent to veto joint custody by withholding
consent would limit the court's discretionary powers because "a
judge would be powerless to order joint custody even if [it] appeared
to be in the best interest of the child. ' 20 Such a result would not
only be unfortunate, but would contravene the express command
of the Domestic Relations Law that the court "give such direction,
between the parties, for the custody ... of any child of the, parties,
200. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6.
201. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
202. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6; cf. Kerns v. Kerns, 59 Md. App. 87,
95-96, 474 A.2d 925, 930 (1984) ("very existence of conflicting views on the subject
[of joint custody] illustrates the necessity for leaving the resolution of such disputes
in each case to the sound judicial discretion of the [court]"); see supra notes 196-
99 and accompanying text.
203. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6. Such factors include the following: (1)
both parents must be fit; (2) both parents must desire continuing involvement with
their child; (3) the child should view both parents as a source of security and love
and; (4) both parents must exhibit potential for cooperation in raising the child.
For a discussion of these factors, see supra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
Accord Bratt, supra note 37, at 303; see also Joint Custody, supra note 9, at 369.
204. See Commentary, supra note 171, at 6. Currently, many states require
judges to make specific findings in the event they modify or deny joint custody.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 25.20.100, 25.21.110 (1983); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 4600.5(c)
(West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b) (West 1986); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West 1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B (1983);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(2) (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A)
(Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (Supp. 1986); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 208 § 31 (Law Co-op. 1981 & Supp. 1986); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.26a(l) (West Supp. 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224(1) (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(3)(a) (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:17(I)(a)
(1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 5307 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
205. Commentary, supra note 171, at 6.
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as ... justice requires, having regard to the circumstances of the
case and . .. to the best interests of the child." 2°6
V. Conclusion
When joint custody works it is likely to be in the best interests
of the child, because unlike sole custody it preserves the child's
family status as it existed before the parental breakup. Given the
mandate of the Domestic Relations Law that child custody is to be
determined solely in the best interests of the child, the New York
courts must adopt an approach to joint custody that will ensure
that it is given full consideration, even when one party objects to
such an arrangement. One way to accomplish this goal is to join
with the majority of states that have addressed the issue, and rec-
ognize that under proper-albeit limited circumstances" 7-courts
may award joint custody over the opposition of one parent.
Daniel R. Mummery
206. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1986).
207. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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